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Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §§ 10-302 
through 10-309 (1989) outline the 
proper procedures for administer-
ing the Breathalyzer test and at-
tempt to resolve questions as to its 
admissibility. Id. at 1103-05. In 
1986, the legislature amended sec-
tion 10-309(a) to permit the intro-
duction of a refusal to take the 
Breathalyzer test into evidence at 
trial, but left unchanged thatportion 
ofthe statute which stated that a jury 
could make no inferences or pre-
sumptions from that evidence con-
cerning guilt or innocence. Id. at 
1106-07. The court of appeals inter-
preted the language of section 10-
309 to mean that evidence of a re-
fusal to submitto a Breathalyzer test 
could only be applied to collateral 
matters that were not material or 
relevant to the defendant's guilt or 
innocence, such as whether the test 
was properly administered. Id. at 
1107. 
The court of appeals noted that 
Krauss clearly stated at trial that he 
would not question whether he was 
properly given the opportunity to 
take the Breathalyzer test. Id. at 
1107. Thus, the court found, ''there 
was no collateral matter in question, 
and there appeared no sound reason 
for the State to introduce evidence 
ofthe refusal except to influence the 
jury toward a verdict of guilty." Id. 
at 1107-08. 
The court of appeals rejected the 
state's argument that the admission 
of the Breathalyzer test was harm-
less error. Id. at 1108. Although the 
facts showed some evidence that 
put Krauss's sobriety into doubt, 
there was also conflicting evidence 
showing that Krauss had sustained a 
head injury. Id. The court stated 
that it was the jury's function to 
weigh the evidence. Id. at 1108. 
The court could not conclude be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the 
error in admitting the Breathalyzer 
test in no way influenced the jury's 
verdict. Id. (applying Dorsey v. 
State. 350 A.2d 665, 679 (Md. 
1976». Finally, the court ruled that 
the trial judge's brief jury instruc-
tions did not overcome the prejudi-
cial effect of admitting into evi-
dence Krauss's refusal to take the 
Breathalyzer test. Id. 
Judge McAuliffe led the dissent 
by arguing that section 10-309 was 
properly drafted to avoid misappre-
hension and speculation on the part 
of jurors. Id. at 1109. The dissent 
suggested that the legislature wrote 
section 10-309 to give the state an 
opportunity to dispel any mistaken 
belief among the jurors that the de-
fendant had no right to refuse or was 
not given the opportunity to take the 
Breathalyzertest. The dissentthere-
fore believed that admitting the 
defendant's refusal to take the test 
Lane v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. 
Co.: STATUTE OFLIMITA-
TIONS DOES NOT BEGIN TO 
RUN ON AN INSURED 
MOTORIST'S CONTRACT 
CLAIM UNTIL INSURER 
DENIES COVERAGE. 
In Lane v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. 
Co., 582 A.2d 501 (Md. 1990), the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland found 
that in a breach of contract action by 
an insured motorist against his in-
surance carrier, the three-year stat-
ute oflimitations began to run when 
the contract was actually breached 
by the insurance company when it 
denied coverage under the policy. 
The holding rejected the view es-
poused by the court of special ap-
peals in Yingling v. Phillips, 501 
A.2d 87 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985), 
that an insured's breach of contract 
action accrued when the insured mo-
would merely place the state on "a torist first discovered that the 
level playing field." Id. tortfeasor was uninsured. 
According to the decision in Mr. and Mrs. William Lane were 
Krauss, the state will no longer be involved in an auto accident when a 
able to admit evidence that a drunk vehicle driven by Guy Callaway 
driver refused to take a Breathalyzer tried to pass them on the left-hand 
test, unless the driver first calls into side of the road. As Callaway at-
question the method by which the tempted to pass the Lanes, an on-
test was administered. Only incases coming vehicle, driven by Joseph 
where the defendant claims the po- Warren and owned by Michael 
lice officer did not offer him the test McKenna, forced Callaway off the 
oritwasimproperlyperformedcould road and hit the Lanes' vehicle. The 
the evidence of his refusal then be Lanes sustained permanent injuries 
admitted. The holding in Krauss from the collision. At the time of 
severely curtails the state's ability the accident, the Lanes had an auto-
to offer evidence that the defendant mobile liability insurance policy with 
refused a Breathalyzer test. Unless Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. 
the legislature decides to amend the (Nationwide). Nationwide was in-
statute, the state has lost an impor- formed ofthe collision shortly after 
tant piece of trial evidence, tipping it occurred. 
the balance in favor of the de fen- In December of 1982, the Lanes 
dant, and, thereby resulting in fewer filed a tort action against Callaway, 
drunk driving convictions. Warren and McKenna, and notified 
- Karl Phillips Nationwideofthependingsuit. Prior 
to the filing of the tort action, the 
Lanes discovered that neither War-
ren nor McKenna had automobile 
insurance. The Lanes' attorney sent 
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copies of the tort complaint to Na-
tionwide, along with a letter duly 
notifying Nationwide that McKenna 
and Warren were uninsured motor-
ists. Nationwide chose not to inter-
vene in the suit. 
The tort action was still pending 
as of April 1986, when the Lanes 
filed suit against Nationwide for 
breach of contract. The suit alleged 
that Nationwide breached its con-
tract by failing to pay for the Lanes' 
injuries pursuant to the uninsured 
motorist provisions of the automo-
bile liability insurance policy. Na-
tionwide responded by filing a mo-
tion for summary judgment, alleg-
ing that the suit was barred by the 
three-year statute of limitations. 
Nationwide asserted that limitations 
began to run upon the Lanes' dis-
covery that Warren and McKenna 
were uninsured. 
The circuit court agreed with Na-
tionwide. The court of special ap-
peals affirmed the decision, and fur-
ther held that the statute of limita-
tions began to run when Warren and 
McKenna's status as uninsured 
motorists was ascertained, regard-
less ofthe fact that the tort suit was 
still pending when the contract suit 
was filed. Thereafter, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland granted cer-
tiorari to resolve the issue of when 
the statute of limitations began to 
run against the insurance carrier re-
garding its obligation to pay ben-
efits in uninsured motorist actions. 
The court of appeals first looked 
to Maryland's Insurance Code. The 
Code stated, in part, that all insur-
ance policies for motor vehicles "is-
sued, sold, or delivered in this State 
. . . shall contain coverage . . . for 
damages which the insured is en-
titled to recover from the owner or 
operator of an uninsured motor ve-
hicle because of bodily injuries sus-
tained arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance, or use of such 
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uninsured motor vehicle." Lane, 
582 A.2d at 502-03 n.2 (quoting 
Md. Ann. Code art. 48A, § 541 
(1986 & Supp. 1990». The court 
stated that public policy required 
insurance carriers to include 
uninsured motorist provisions in 
their policies so that "innocent vic-
tims ... who are unable to recover 
from financially irresponsible 
uninsured motorists" would be com-
pensated. Lane, 582 A.2d at 503 
(citations omitted). 
The court of appeals noted that 
the lower appellate court had relied 
primarily upon its prior decision in 
Yingling v. Phillips, 501 A.2d 87 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985), where it 
held that the insured's cause of ac-
tion for recovery of uninsured mo-
torist benefits accrued once the in-
sured discovered the tortfeasor was 
uninsured. Lane, 582 A.2d at 503-
04 (citing Yingling, 501 A.2d at 90). 
Consequently, the court of special 
appeals found that the statute of 
limitations began to run at the same 
time. Id. 
When the court of special ap-
peals erroneously asserted that the 
statute of limitations began to run 
upon the discovery that the 
tortfeasors were uninsured, it essen-
tially found that limitations began 
to run in the contract action before 
the contract was actually breached 
by Nationwide. Id.582A.2dat503. 
The court of appeals rejected this 
conclusion because it was at odds 
with general contract principles and 
prior decisions. Id. (citing Reese v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 403 
A.2d 1229, 1232 (Md. 1979». 
The Reese court construed 
Maryland's uninsured motorist stat-
ute as providing that the insured 
party had the option of deciding 
whether to bring a tort or a contract 
action with regard to uninsured 
motorist compensation. Lane, 582 
A.2d at 505. Therefore, if the in-
sured decided to first pursue an in-
dependent tort action against the 
uninsured tortfeasor, he was not 
seeking compensation under the in-
surance policy. In choosing not to 
initially file an action in contract 
against his own insurer, there was 
no contract suit, and thus no breach 
of contract. Id. 
The court of appeals noted that 
previous actions by insured motor-
ists against their insurers for 
uninsured motorist benefits have 
been held to be contract actions. 
Thus, general contract principles and 
procedures governed. Id. at 503. 
The court found that an insured 
motorist had two options when 
bringing a suit: the insured could 
bring a contract action against his 
own insurance company initially, or 
he could bring a tort action directly 
against the uninsured tortfeasor and 
then pursue a contract action against 
the uninsured motorist carrier. Id. at 
503. 
Thus, the insured motorist was 
not required to request compensa-
tion for his loss under his insurance 
policy; rather, he had the option of 
first bringing a tort action. Id. at 
505. Therefore, the court ofappeals 
emphasized that the statute of limi-
tations could not begin to run in a 
contract action until compensation 
was requested and subsequently 
denied by the insurance carrier. Id. 
In such a situation, the insurer is 
protected via notification of the tort 
action, thus giving it a chance to 
intervene to protect its own inter-
ests. Id. at 505. If it were indeed 
found that the statute of limitations 
started to run upon the discovery 
that the tortfeasor was uninsured, 
then ''the insured's statutory option 
of first bringing a tort suit against 
the uninsured motorist, and thereaf-
ter making a claim under his 
uninsured motorist endorsement, 
[would] be frustrated." Id. at 506. 
Accordingly, in Lane v. Nation-
wide Mut. Ins. Co., the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland expressly 
overruled Yingling v. Phillips, and 
held that when the insured party 
seeks to recover benefits from his 
automobile liability insurance car-
rier (even if he has already timely 
exercised his option to try to recover 
damages in tort, having notified the 
insurer of such an intent), the suit 
against the insurer was governed by 
traditional contract principles. As 
such, the three-year statute of limi-
tations did not begin to run against 
the insured until the insurer breached 
the contract by denying coverage of 
the claim. Such a holding enables 
an insured motorist to wait until the 
carrier actually denies coverage be-
fore filing a contract suit. By plac-
ing the burden on the insurance car-
rier to make an affirmative denial, 
the insured no longer takes the risk 
that limitations might run merely 
because he or she was aware the 
other motorist was uninsured. 
- Jennifer K. Etheridge 
Minnick v. Mississippi: RIGHT 
TO COUNSEL DURING 
CUSTODIAL INTERROGA-
TION BARS POLICE INITI-
ATED DISCUSSIONS UNLESS 
COUNSEL IS PRESENT. 
In Minnickv. Mississippi, IllS. 
Ct. 486 (1990), the United States 
Supreme Court reversed the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court when it ruled 
that when a defendant in custody 
has requested counsel, officials may 
not reinitiate interrogation without 
counsel present. This holds true 
even if the accused has consulted 
with his attorney since making the 
request. 
Robert Minnick was arrested in 
1986 in California on a Mississippi 
warrant for capital murder. The 
next day, two FBI agents re-read 
him his Miranda rights. Although 
he acknowledged that he understood 
them, Minnick refused to sign a 
waiver of rights form. He agreed to 
continue the interview but said he 
would not answer"very many" ques-
tions. Id. at488. He then proceeded 
to answer a number of questions 
concerning his escape from a Mis-
sissippi jail and his subsequent flight. 
He concluded the interview by say-
ing, "[ c lome back Monday when I 
have a lawyer," and that he would 
make a more complete statement at 
that time. Id. at 488. By Monday, 
the accused had spoken with his 
lawyer two or three times and been 
told in no uncertain terms ''to talk to 
nobody." Id. at 493. 
On Monday morning, a deputy 
sheriff from Mississippi came to the 
California jail in order to question 
Minnick. Having been told by his 
jailers that he would "have to talk" 
to the deputy and that he "could not 
refuse," Minnick proceeded to con-
fess his part in several murders com-
mitted following his escape. Id. at 
488-89. Minnick confessed that he 
and fellow prisoner, James Dyess, 
broke into the victim's mobile home 
after escaping from a county jail in 
Mississippi. When the victim re-
turned home, he was killed by Dyess. 
Minnick was then handed a pistol 
and ordered at gunpoint to shoot the 
victim's friend. He did. 
The motion to suppress these 
statements, as given to the Missis-
sippi deputy, was denied. Minnick 
was convicted on two counts of 
capital murder and sentenced to 
death. On appeal, the Supreme Court 
of Mississippi upheld the trial court 
ruling that the defendant's Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel had 
been satisfied. The United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
examine whether the defendant's 
Fifth Amendment right to counsel 
had been terminated or merely sus-
pended by his previous consulta-
tions with counsel. 
Justice Kennedy began the analy-
sis by examining the language of 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966), where the Court held that 
police must terminate their interro-
gation of an accused in custody when 
the accused requests counsel. At 
that point, ''the individual must have 
an opportunity to confer with the 
attorney and to have him present 
during any subsequent questioning." 
Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 489 (quoting 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474). Turning 
to Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 
477 (1981), the Court determined 
that having requested an attorney, 
an accused "is not subject to further 
interrogation by the authorities un-
til counsel has been made available 
to him, unless the accused himself 
initiates further interrogation by the 
authorities until counsel has been 
made available to him, unless the 
accused himself initiates further 
communication, exchanges, or con-
versations with the police." Id. at 
490 (citing Edwards, 451 U.S. at 
484-85). This legal precedent left 
open the possibility of a defendant 
impliedly asking for counsel at each 
and every new custodial interroga-
tion. The issue posed in Minnick, 
therefore, was whether the Edwards I 
requirement of counsel at custodial 
interrogations was satisfied after the 
suspect had consulted with an attor-
ney. 
In support of allowing 
uncounseled confessions, the Su-
preme Court of Mississippi had 
rested its holding on the theory that 
the Fifth Amendment requirement 
dissipated once the accused met with 
counsel and could only be reinstated 
by another request for counsel. 
Minnick, 111 S. Ct. at 490. The 
Supreme Court, however, refused 
to follow this proposition for three 
reasons. First, a holding that al-
lowed the Fifth Amendment rightto 
-------------------------- 22.1/fhe Law Forum - 39 
